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Metabranding and Intermediation: A 
Response to Professor Fleischert 
Laura A. Heymanntt 
l. INTRODUCTION 
In his article The MasterCard !PO: Protecting the Priceless 
Brand, published in this issue, 1 Victor Fleischer contends that the 
legal structure of the MasterCard initial public offering2 - in particu-
lar, the creation of a charitable foundation to hold a block of the is-
sued shares - suggests that something else is going on rather than 
pure economics. Had MasterCard truly been motivated by altruism, 
Prof. Fleischer argues, the credit card association could have found 
more efficient ways of giving away its money than through a separate 
foundation. Hence, the foundation's creation leads Prof. Fleischer to 
wonder what else might have motivated its genesis, and he concludes 
that its branding effect is a likely explanation - in other words, that 
MasterCard will, as a result, be seen as a more altruistic company.3 
Prof. Fleischer's work reminds us that branding efforts occur all 
around us and do not always take the shape of overt advertising cam-
paigns. Just as, in our personal lives, we may take a particular pub-
lic action (say, rush to open the door for a stranger overburdened with 
t © Laura A. Heymann 2006. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may 
reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for 
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to 
the Harvard Negotiation Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright 
notice. 
tt Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law. Many thanks to Mark Fenster, Victor Fleischer, Trotter Hardy, Paul 
Marcus, Susan Scafidi, and the participants in the Harvard Negotiation Law Review 
symposium at which this Essay was presented for helpful comments. 
1. Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard !PO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12 
HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 137 (2006). 
2. The MasterCard IPO took place on May 24, 2006, and raised $2.39 billion. 
High Interest in !PO Sends MasterCard Shares Up 18%, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2006, at 
Cl. 
3. A month after the IPO took place, MasterCard announced that it was chang-
ing its corporate name from MasterCard International to MasterCard Worldwide and 
introducing a new corporate logo and tagline, "The Heart of Commerce." Jay Loomis, 
MasterCard International Changing Corporate Name, THE JouRNAL NEws, June 28, 
2006, at 9C. 
201 
202 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 12 Symposium:201 
shopping bags) not only because it is the right thing to do but also 
because we are interested in the accretion of personal goodwill, corpo-
rations may take public actions that, while not "advertising" in the 
traditional sense, are intended to burnish their public image. In this 
vein, Prof. Fleischer may be correct that there is something behind 
the creation of MasterCard's new charitable foundation beyond eco-
nomic efficiency or tax advantages. But it's not clear that we should 
be overly concerned about MasterCard's intentions, even if, as Prof. 
Fleischer contends, the foundation is nothing more than a "corporate 
governance gimmick. "4 
When we talk about the success or failure of a branding cam-
paign, we often focus on the efforts of the branding entity: how much 
money was spent on advertising campaigns, which advertising entity 
should be credited with the creative concept, and so forth. But as 
Barton Beebe and others have noted with respect to trademarks in 
particular, this focus is placed precisely on the wrong end of the inter-
pretive transaction. 5 Brand meaning is not created until the recipi-
ent of the messages both receives those messages and gives them any 
particular relevance; an advertising campaign falling alone in the for-
est makes no sound. Thus, a brand's meaning doesn't exist in the 
abstract, nor does it depend on the interpretation intended by the 
producer; rather, any meaning that exists does so because consumers 
are willing to give credence to the message that's conveyed (or, in-
deed, some alternative message should consumers be so inclined). A 
brand holder can put as much money as it likes into telling the public 
what to think about its brand, but at the end of the day, such efforts 
have value only if consumers agree to give them value. Postmodern-
ism may to some rest in the graveyard of literary theory, but it is 
alive and well in trademark law.6 
4. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 153. Indeed, Prof. Fleischer suggests that the pub-
lic may be well aware that MasterCard has not acted entirely altruistically. /d. 
5. Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 
2020, 2021-25 (2005) (discussing the belief that "trademarks are a property purely of 
consumers' minds"); Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDozo ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 10 (1999) ("[T]he public forms an interpretive community whose reading 
of trademark symbolism casts it in the role of creating authorial-like meanings about 
the mark itself."); RosEMARY CooMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PRoP-
ERTY: AUTHoRSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAw 8 (1998); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The 
Death of Ontology: A Theological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IowA L. REv. 611, 
653 n.174 (1999). 
6. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseu-
donymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1420-24 (2005); STE-
PHEN BROWN, PosTMoDERN MARKETING 169 (1995) ("In elevating the interpretations 
of the reader over the authority of the author, Barthes was merely espousing the mar-
keting concept by another name. After all, the revolutionary aspect of the marketing 
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Trademark law reinforces this view of the cognitive process 
among consumers by giving little weight to the particular meaning 
that consumers give to any single mark and focusing instead on con-
sumers' negotiation among marks. Except to the extent that it sin-
gles out famous or particularly distinctive marks for special 
treatment,7 trademark law does not much care what kind of associa-
tions consumers make with the brand: whether a brand is a prestige 
brand or not, or whether the brand is viewed favorably by consumers 
or with a certain amount of derision. Rather, trademark law is gen-
erally concemed, first, with whether consumers will perceive a mark 
as a trademark at all (that is, as a source identifier)- hence the ini-
tial focus on whether a claimed term is generic, as well as the consid-
eration of whether a mark is inherently distinctive or descriptive -
and secondly with whether consumers have the ability in the context 
in question to distinguish that mark from other, similar marks on 
related goods or services. In this regard, a valid, protectable mark for 
a low-prestige item is given just as much protection as a valid, pro-
tectable mark for a high-prestige item: Hustler and The New York 
Times are equivalents in this respect. 
None of this, of course, stops corporations from attempting to in-
fluence the meaning that consumers will attach to a particular brand. 
Millions of dollars are spent on advertising campaigns that en-
courage consumers to create not only an association between the 
brand and the product but also an association between the brand and 
the brand's meaning: not only that "Ford" means one kind of automo-
bile as opposed to others but also that "Ford" means, say, patriotic, or 
nostalgic, or dependable. A soft drink manufacturer might broadcast 
commercials showing young, attractive consumers of various nation-
alities to convey a message of global peace and harmony. A manufac-
turer of athletic apparel might use a well-known and admired athlete 
as its spokesperson to convey the message that users of its products 
can achieve similar heights. Indeed, producers engaging in such ad-
vertising efforts act very much in the mold of the Romantic author,8 
concept was that it considered the needs of the consumer (reader), not those of the 
producer (author), to be the key to success in business."). 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (codification of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act). 
8. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, 
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413, 1463-69 (1992) (describing the 
development of the "romantic author" vision of authorship); James D. A. Boyle, The 
Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 625, 628-33 
(1988) (describing the "romantic vision" of authorship). 
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believing that repeated claims to primacy in interpretation will even-
tually succeed of their own weight: If the message is repeated often 
enough, it will attain the level of truth. 
While direct advertising to consumers is perhaps the most promi-
nent way in which corporations work to control the interpretation of 
their brands, it is not the only way in which such attempts at author-
ship occur. Prof. Fleischer has made a contribution to the branding 
literature as well as the corporate finance literature in this issue and 
elsewhere9 by focusing on other ways in which companies encourage 
consumers to give a particular meaning to the brand. Just as certain 
cosmetic companies hope to attach a particular consumer reaction to 
their brands by advertising their goods as cruelty-free, 10 or certain 
supermarkets advertise their brand as indicating the source of or-
ganic, healthful goods,11 it is possible that, as Prof. Fleischer sug-
gests, the IPO structure a company uses can also have a branding 
effect. In other words, by choosing an unorthodox structure for its 
initial public offering (an auction, for example), a company can send a 
message (accepted or not) to the relevant public about the type of 
company it is (cutting-edge, for example). 
But because the audience is the entity that determines brand 
meaning, not the creator of the brand, 12 it is important in such situa-
tions to consider precisely who the audience is and the process of in-
terpretation that takes place as the meaning of a brand develops. In 
his article in this issue, 13 Prof. Fleischer contends that the creation of 
a charitable foundation as part of the structure of MasterCard's ini-
tial public offering must be functioning to some extent as a branding 
9. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal 
Structures, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1581 (2006). 
10. The Body Shop's product labels, to take one example, state that the company 
is against animal testing. See The Body Shop, http://www.thebodyshopinternational. 
com/V alues+and+Campaigns/Our+ Values/ Against+Animal + Testing/Home.htm (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2006). 
11. Whole Foods Market is one such supermarket. See Whole Foods, http:// 
www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/declaration.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
12. Courts in trademark law cases recognize this explicitly. See, e.g. , Co-Rect 
Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985) 
("Desires or intentions of the creator ... are irrelevant. Instead, it is the attitude of 
the consumer that is important."); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 
F.2d 1342, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("Regardless of the [mark owner's] intentions, it is 
the association, by the consumer, of the . . . design with the [mark owner] as the 
source that is determinative."); Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 827 
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding that in determining distinctiveness, "it is the association of 
the mark with a particular source by the ultimate consumers which is to be measured 
-not [the applicant's] intent" in adopting the mark). 
13. Fleischer, supra note 1. 
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device, given that it is not the most efficient way of engaging in phi-
lanthropy. Prof. Fleischer asserts that while the foundation may en-
hance the brand image ofthe company, he is not optimistic, noting a 
"disconnect between the MasterCard foundation's purported philan-
thropic goals and its low levels of anticipated charitable giving. "14 In 
addition, Prof. Fleischer criticizes the apparent disjuncture between 
the intended recipients of MasterCard's philanthropy - programs 
that support education and microfinance initiatives15 - and Master-
Card's brand image as the embodiment of consumerism.16 While 
both of these critiques may be true as a factual matter, they do not 
take into account the audience that is interpreting this branding ef-
fort. When a corporation uses its corporate structure or the structure 
of its initial public offering to communicate something about the na-
ture of the company itself (whether this meaning is true or not), to 
whom is it speaking? Is the audience for this message the market for 
the IPO, the market for the card itself, or some third group? I submit 
here that the most immediate audience is in fact a third group 
through which much of the interpretive work is likely to occur - fi-
nancial newspapers, brokers, and the like - and which will help in-
termediate this message. If this is the case, then the factual 
disconnects between the branding message and the realities of imple-
mentation become less important: The messenger ultimately conveys 
the message. And while responsive to Prof. Fleischer's insight, this 
critique also has broader implications for trademark law more gener-
ally: The fact that such branding intermediaries have a significant 
role to play in the creation of the brand, including whether to convey 
or contradict the producer's intended meaning, calls into question 
whether other disruption of intended brand meaning (such as that 
prohibited by dilution law) should be seen as problematic. 
II. CREATING THE BRANDING MoMENT 
A. Kinds of Branding 
Advertising is obviously commonplace in our consumer culture. 
From print advertising to television and radio commercials, to In-
ternet banner and pop-up advertisements, consumers encounter mul-
titudes of attempts each day to influence their purchasing decisions. 
14. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 139. 
15. See, The MasterCard Foundation, http://www.mastercardfoundation.org (last 
visited July 5, 2006). 
16. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 141. 
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Each such advertising instance is an attempt not only to communi-
cate something about the product or service at issue to consumers but 
also to link that communication to the brand attached to that product 
or service. It does a company little good to persuade consumers about 
the benefits of its new widget if it does not also firmly cement in con-
sumers' minds the fact that the advertisement concerned an Acme 
brand widget.17 
This is not to say, however, that all advertising is of the brand-
recognition ("The new Acme widget- ask for it by name") or brand-
distinction ("The new Acme widget is durable, yet pocket-sized") type. 
A good deal of advertising is comparative, or brand-differentiating, in 
which the product's or service's qualities are communicated in com-
parison to those of other producers ("The Acme widget finishes the 
job faster than Nadir's widget"). Much advertising today, however, 
neither conveys attributes of the product or service directly nor 
presents a comparison with other products but instead is "atmos-
pheric advertising'': an attempt to create an atmosphere or image 
surrounding the product as "a contribution to the complex symbol 
which is the brand image."18 Indeed, proponents of expansive intel-
lectual property rights for brand owners tout this aspect of branding 
as what creates the "true worth" of brands.19 Television and print 
17. Advertising is particularly important in this respect because it is likely the 
case, in many instances, that consumers would not be able to distinguish among vari-
ous products in a particular category without the assistance of brands. See, e.g., Sa-
muel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally 
Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 379, 379-87 (2004) (finding that branding had a dra-
matic influence on neural responses to delivery of cola products); see also Robert N. 
Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trade-
mark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 859 (1997) ("[P]roducts that are virtually 
indistinguishable from one another sell for very different prices on the value of the 
brand persona."); Burleigh B. Gardner & Sidney J. Levy, The Product and the Brand, 
33 HARv. Bus. REv. 33, 35 (March-April1955) (noting that "conceptions of the differ-
ent brands must be compounded of subtle variations in feelings about them; not nec-
essarily in product qualities"); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public 
Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1183 (1948) (contending that the choice between one 
highly advertised product and another is "only a choice ... between one illusion and 
another"). 
18. Gardner & Levy, supra note 17, at 35; See also Sarah C. Haan, Note, The 
"Persuasion Route" of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1281, 1288-1300 (2000) (describing the move in advertising from "features and bene-
fits" advertising to affective advertising). 
19. Steve Hartman, Brand Equity Impairment - The Meaning of Dilution, 87 
TRADEMARK REP. 418, 418 (1997) (noting that brand equity is "at the core of a trade-
mark's value"); id. at 419 (defining "brand equity' as "[t]he collective impressions 
made by [the public's] perceptions and associations" of and with a product); Jerre B. 
Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand 
Equity as Protectable Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 276 
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advertisements for the Apple iPod MP3 player in 2003 communicated 
nothing about the features of the product but instead simply featured 
slick, modern graphics (the black silhouette of various users of the 
product with the product, featured in white, the only item visible), 
accompanied (in the television ads) by hip, cutting-edge music. 20 
Nike's "Just Do It" television and print campaign likewise related no 
attributes of the company's athletic wear, instead featuring various 
well-known athletes engaged in competition.21 MasterCard's more 
recent "Priceless" advertising campaign, as discussed below, also falls 
into this third category. 
B. The Branding of MasterCard 
First introduced in the 1960s, bank-issued credit cards like Mas-
terCard provide both a convenient means of payment (and an inter-
est-free short-term loan) for those with the financial resources to pay 
off their bills each month and a source of credit for those without such 
resources.22 More than 641 million cards were in circulation in the 
United States in 2004;23 MasterCard, for its part, claims 749.3 mil-
lion MasterCard-branded cards in circulation worldwide, issuing 
from close to 25,000 financial institutions.24 The Federal Reserve 
(1994) ("The true worth of brands ... is their capacity, like an 'old friend,' to generate 
a distinct set of warm and welcome associations .... ") (footnote omitted). This is not 
to say, however, that such branding is uniformly successful; indeed, consumers' reac-
tion to branding may be due to their own personalities rather than to what they see in 
the advertisement. See Todd A. Mooradian, Personality and Ad-Evoked Feelings: The 
Case for Extraversion and Neuroticism, 24 J. AcAD. MARKETING Sci. 99, 108 (1996) 
(concluding that "consumers differ in the way they respond to emotional appeals in 
advertisements and that at least some of those differences are explained by basic, 
readily measured [personality) traits"). 
20. See, e.g., Apple, http://www .apple.com/ipodlads/rollerskating/320.html (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2006) (Rollerskating advertisement). 
21. See, e.g., Nike, http://www.nike.com/nikesoccer/justdoit/spot/video.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2006) (Nike soccer ad). 
22. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 80, 83 
(2000); Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, 86 
FED. REs. BuLL. 623, 624 (Sept. 2000); Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card 
(PBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/credit/interviews/yingling.html. 
23. Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/credit/etc/synopsis.html. One report estimates that more than 75 per-
cent of the adult population in the United States has a credit card and that this per-
centage will rise to 80 percent by the year 2015. Jeanne M. Hogarth, Marianne A. 
Hilgert & Jane M. Kolodinsky, Voting with Your Feet: Consumers' Problems with 
Credit Cards and Exit Behaviors, 48 CoNSUMER INT. ANN. 1, 1-10 (2002), available at 
http://www .consumerinterests.org/files/public/V otingFeet-02. pdf. 
24. MasterCard Company Fact Sheet, www.mastercardinternational.com/news-
room/company_fact.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). 
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has estimated that in 2003, 15.2 billion payments were made using 
the four major general purpose credit card brands (Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express, and Discover), totaling $1.4 trillion dollars.25 
Like any other provider of goods or services, MasterCard engages 
in direct consumer advertising. These branding efforts differ, how-
ever, from many branding efforts in other industry sectors in two 
ways. First, because MasterCard is a membership association and 
not a credit card issuer, its brand is attached to services that Master-
Card does not provide to consumers. 26 Consumers may encounter 
the brand on the cards themselves or on merchant displays, but 
neither of these uses identifies the source of any goods or services, 
given that MasterCard does not "issue cards, set annual fees on 
cards, determine annual percentage rates, solicit merchants to accept 
cards or set their discount rates. Instead, MasterCard's customer fi-
nancial institutions manage the relationships with consumers and 
merchants."27 Thus, this is not like a traditional franchise situation 
(McDonald's, for example), where the brand owner exercises a high 
degree of control over the franchisees' activities; if anything, the use 
ofthe MasterCard brand is more like instances in which a university 
or a sports team licenses the use of its logo to be attached to goods 
(apparel or, indeed, credit cards28) that it doesn't itself provide. In 
each of these cases, the use of the brand conveys to the consumer not 
source but, at most, affiliation. 
Second, because the growth rate of credit card adoption appears 
to be slowing,29 MasterCard's brand advertising is likely directed just 
as much at existing cardholders as at new customers, encouraging 
those who already hold the card to use it in future transactions and 
thereby generate income for MasterCard through interchange fees.3° 
25. Geoffrey R. Gerdes, Jack K. Walton II, May X. Liu & Darrel W. Parke, Trends 
in the Use of Payment Instruments in the United States, 91 FED. REs. BULL. 180, 181 
(Spring 2005). 
26. American Express and Discover, by contrast, issued their own cards until re-
cently. Both now issue cards through financial institutions as well. 
27. MasterCard Company Fact Sheet, supra note 24. 
28. Thus, consumers may use credit cards as a way of declaring their own affilia-
tions. See Colin Beasty, Online Credit Card Branding Is Weak, http://www.destina-
tioncrm.com/articles/default.asp?ArticleiD=5319 (last viewed Apr. 2, 2006) (quoting a 
research analyst as noting that "card appearance is a decision factor for many 
customers"). 
29. Gerdes et al., supra note 25, at 184 (noting that the credit card is reaching 
maturity as a payment instrument). 
30. See, e.g., Kelly Shermach, "Use My Card, Please," CREDIT CARD MGMT., Apr. 
2005, at 16 (noting that banks (and, thereby, card associations) obtain revenue from 
credit cards only when the customer uses the card at a merchant). Thus, credit card 
brand advertising differs slightly from credit card issuer advertising (such as through 
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Unlike advertising for dog food or shampoo, the goal of which is to get 
the consumer to choose a particular product off the shelf during the 
next shopping experience, MasterCard's advertising is probably not 
primarily directed at influencing the consumer's decision to acquire a 
new MasterCard. The consumer is more likely to acquire a new 
credit card through a solicitation from the issuing bank, whether by 
direct mail or in person. (This may not have been true for single-
issuer cards such as American Express, whose "Membership has its 
privileges" campaign, which launched in the late 1980s, was an at-
tempt to elevate the American Express card to a status good that 
might be affirmatively acquired by new consumers.) And because 
many consumers hold more than one credit card, MasterCard must 
be particularly sensitive to the low switching costs incurred in simply 
taking one card out of the wallet rather than another.31 
Both of these differences - the fact that the MasterCard brand 
represents affiliation rather than source and the fact that the target 
audience for MasterCard's advertising is likely existing, rather than 
new, consumers - lead naturally to atmospheric advertising over 
brand-distinguishing or brand-differentiation advertising. Having no 
day-to-day ability to control the business activities that increase the 
goodwill of the brand or to encourage consumers to acquire the Mas-
terCard brand in a competitive marketplace, MasterCard must rely 
most heavily on advertising that contributes to the meaning of the 
MasterCard brand rather than touts its comparative advantages. 32 
direct mail solicitations) in that issuer advertising attempts to get the user to acquire 
an additional card. See Zywicki, supra note 22, at 142 ("[T]he likely effect of credit 
card advertising is simply to increase competition, increase consumer information, 
and redistribute credit card users among various issuers, rather than increasing the 
pool of credit card users generally."). 
31. In an October 2005 talk at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, John 
Elkins, executive vice president of global brand marketing at Visa Intemational, sug-
gested that the consumer credit sector enjoys strong name recognition but little con-
sumer loyalty, noting that cards are "very substitutable." The Finer Points of Brand 
Building, available at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/newslheadlines/gmp_elkins-
visa.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). A 2002 report found that of the credit card 
holders surveyed, 55 percent of those who reported a problem with their card (e.g., a 
billing error) stopped using the card or the financial institution. Jeanne M. Hogarth, 
Marianne A. Hilgert & Jane M. Kolodinsky, Voting with Your Feet: Consumers• 
Problems with Credit Cards and Exit Behaviors, at 9, http://www.consumerinterests. 
org/files/public/VotingFeet-02.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
32. Of course, credit card associations can (and do) engage in some degree of com-
parative advertising related to the characteristics of the consumer experience the as-
sociation can control directly -for example, the number of issuing banks or accepting 
merchants. Primarily, however, it would seem that the MasterCard brand is, like 
other brands, used for massive merchandising purposes (such as cartoon characters) 
in that the value of the brand is less as an indication of source and more in its "power 
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Like other credit card organizations, 33 MasterCard has devoted 
significant resources to atmospheric branding. Of particular note is 
MasterCard's "Priceless" campaign, which launched in 1997: An an-
nouncer, over a heartwarming scene of, say, a grandfather and 
grandson at a baseball game or a couple exploring China, lists two 
related items and their costs, then adds a third item corresponding to 
the feel-good aspect of the event (the cost ofwhich is "priceless"), end-
ing with the tag line "There are some things that money can't buy. 
For everything else, there's MasterCard."34 
Like other atmospheric advertising, these commercials tout none 
of the credit card's features - there's no mention of acceptance loca-
tions, interest rates, or credit terms. Rather, the goal is to create a 
wholesome association with the brand itself that will encourage con-
sumers to use MasterCard rather than some other credit card for 
their next commercial transaction. The advertising does this by tell-
ing consumers that the credit card will help them achieve the things 
that are important to them such as relationships with family, life-
affirming travel, and the like. 35 The importance of this brand mean-
ing to MasterCard was revealed in its August 2000 trademark in-
fringement suit against then presidential candidate Ralph Nader, 
to imbue a product line with desirable atmospherics." Jessica Litman, Breakfast with 
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (1999) 
(discussing the "Batman" brand). 
33. See Visa ("It's everywhere you want to be."); American Express ("Don't leave 
home without it" and "Membership has its privileges"); Discover ("It pays to Dis-
cover"). Even less prestigious credit card brands engage in such activities. See Capi-
tal One ("What's in your wallet?"). See generally Edward McKinley, Brand Takes a 
Starring Role, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Apr. 2005, at 40. 
34. See, e.g., Mastercard International Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 
Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The 
ad's format has become so well known that it has inspired numerous satires as well as 
a contest sponsored by MasterCard itself, in which entrants fill in the three blanks of 
a given video. See http://www.priceless.com/promo/exclusives.html (last viewed Apr. 
2, 2006); Seth Stevenson, The End of a Played-Out Ad Campaign?, httpJ/ 
www.slate.com/id/2137884 (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). In 2004, MasterCard expanded 
the same concept to print advertisements, co-branding the ads with the brands of 
leading retailers. Stuart Elliott, MasterCard Revamps Print Ads, N.Y. TIMES, August 
11, 2004, at C3. 
35. This was the intent of the marketing team at MasterCard. See MasterCard-
Finding a Compelling Global Positioning: "Priceless,"' http://www.allaboutbrand-
ing.com/index.lasso?article=418 (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (interview with Lawrence 
Flanagan, Chief Marketing Officer for MasterCard, discussing the "Priceless" cam-
paign) ("[Consumers'] core values are family, security, companionship and 'making 
time for yourself.' It was unique for a credit card company to say to consumers, 'It's 
not about what you buy; it's about how you take care of yourself.'"). Visa has re-
sponded in kind by launching its own "experience" ad campaign, "Life Takes Visa." 
Eric Dash, To Make the Card Special, Try the Warm and Familiar, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 
Winter 2007] Metabranding and Intermediation 211 
who had broadcast a political advertisement that mocked his oppo-
nents using the format of the "Priceless" campaign.36 (The suit was 
not successful: The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Nader, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding 
any likelihood of confusion between MasterCard's product and N a-
der.37) Nader's political advertisement ultimately conveyed two 
messages: Nader's thoughts on the U.S. political system and the 
strength of MasterCard's atmospheric advertising efforts. Nader's ad 
assumed familiarity with its format; it was only because of the perva-
siveness of the "Priceless" campaign that Nader was able to make his 
satire work. MasterCard's reaction to Nader's advertisement illus-
trated the importance of the brand's image: There was little chance 
that viewers would conclude, upon seeing Nader's advertisement, 
that Nader's political campaign was sponsored by MasterCard, but 
there was a chance (at least in MasterCard's view) that consumers' 
(wholesome) associations with the "Priceless" campaign would now be 
tainted with the odor of American politics. 
In short, MasterCard's "Priceless" campaign is a classic example 
of atmospheric advertising that attempts to create meaning in the 
MasterCard brand. It does so not by accreting meaning that is al-
ready inherent in the brand (a convenient method of engaging in 
commercial transactions, with the attendant problems that interest 
rates and minimum payments create) but by transmitting messages 
designed to create the opposite meaning of family values and aspects 
of life untouched by consumerism. Whether this intended meaning is 
accepted by consumers is, of course, a function of their interpretation; 
2006, at C4. American Express, for its part, launched its "My Life, My Card" cam-
paign, featuring celebrity endorsements, in 2004. See id. 
36. Mastercard International Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *2-3. The 
court, describing Nader's ad, stated that: 
[The ad] included a sequential display of a series of items showing the 
price of each ("grilled tenderloin for fund-raiser[:] $1,000 a plate"; "campaign 
ads filled with half-truths: $10 million"; "promises to special interest groups: 
over $100 billion"). The advertisement ends with a phrase identifying a 
priceless intangible that cannot be purchased ("finding out the truth: price-
less. There are some things that money can't buy"). 
ld. As the court later noted, "Mastercard's message depicted in its Priceless Ad-
vertisements is very plain and straightforward. In a series of advertisements, Mas-
terCard presents various intangible moments that are highly valuable, yet unable to 
be 'purchased' or are 'priceless.' Hence, 'there are some things that money can't buy.'" 
Id. at *42. 
37. Id. at *14. The court also granted summary judgment to Nader on Master-
Card's trademark dilution claim, concluding that Nader was engaging in noncommer-
cial activity and thus explicitly exempted from the statute's reach and that there was 
no evidence in the record that Nader's use of MasterCard's trademarks diluted the 
distinctiveness of those marks. ld. at *28-30. 
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MasterCard's ability to influence this interpretation ends at the mo-
ment the advertisements are transmitted. 
C. The MasterCard !PO as a Branding Event 
As part of the new structure of the company after the IPO, 10 
percent of MasterCard's equity (representing about 17 percent of its 
voting rights) was issued to the MasterCard Foundation, a charitable 
foundation incorporated in Canada.38 MasterCard also intended to 
record an expense of an additional $40 million in cash to be donated 
to the Foundation over a period of up to four years.39 The Founda-
tion, MasterCard announced, 
will build on MasterCard's existing charitable giving commit-
ments by continuing to support programs and initiatives that 
help children and youth to access education, understand and 
utilize technology and develop the skills necessary to succeed in 
a diverse and global work force. In addition, the Foundation 
will support organizations that provide microfinance programs 
and services to financially disadvantaged persons and communi-
ties in order to enhance local economies and develop 
entrepreneurs. 4 0 
The announcement about the Foundation's goals has been re-
ceived with some skepticism. One commentator wrote in December 
2005 that some analysts are concerned that the Foundation is a 
"costly ruse" designed to protect a "clubby governance structure," par-
ticularly given that the company has reportedly asked Canadian au-
thorities to relax legal requirements relating to the timing of the 
Foundation's distribution of assets.41 Others, however, see the Foun-
dation as a savvy recognition of philanthropic trends, noting that it 
"reflects MasterCard's desire 'to be on the cutting edge of where it 
believes corporate responsibility will be in the 21st century."'42 
In his contribution to this issue, Prof. Fleischer contends that 
MasterCard's IPO structure is motivated at least in part by an at-
tempt to influence the meaning of the MasterCard brand by, in par-
ticular, establishing a charitable foundation. The message conveyed, 
in Prof. Fleischer's view, is that MasterCard is a community-minded 
organization with philanthropic motivations, contrary to the crass 
38. MasterCard Incorporated Form S-1 (filed Sept. 15, 2005), at 5. 
39. MasterCard Incorporated Form 10Q (quarter ending Sept. 30, 2005), at 27. 
40. Id.; see also http://www.mastercardfoundation.org (last visited July 5, 2006). 
41. James B. Kelleher, Lifting the Lid: In MasterCard !PO, a Charity's Role 
Questioned, http://www.msnbc.com/id/8433784 (last visited Apr. 9, 2006). 
42. Id. (quoting David Robertson, publisher of the Nilson Report). 
Winter 2007] Metabranding and Intermediation 213 
commercialism that the consumer credit industry represents.43 But 
even if the creation of the Foundation through the IPO is a branding 
event, as Prof. Fleischer contends, it is important to recognize the 
significant differences between this branding attempt and other, 
more traditional, efforts. First, the branding-through-IPO to which 
Prof. Fleischer refers is a branding that is slightly different even 
within the category of atmospheric branding generally, in that it is 
not an attempt to create brand equity in the product itself but rather 
brand equity in the corporate entity that, it is hoped, will translate 
more or less directly into financial equity. Of course, corporate 
branding is not an unusual endeavor: McDonald's engages in it with 
its sponsorship of the Ronald McDonald House, a residence for fami-
lies of children with life-threatening illnesses;44 other corporations 
sponsor fundraising road races and other charity events. 
Typically, however, even this type of corporate branding includes 
consumers of the company's products as part of the immediate audi-
ence for the atmospheric message.45 When Nike tells the viewer or 
reader "Just Do It," it is speaking directly to the people who Nike 
hopes will buy its athletic gear and will do so because they are in-
spired by the message of athletic achievement conveyed by the adver-
tisement. But here, and this is the second significant difference, the 
direct audience for MasterCard's message- "MasterCard is a philan-
thropic organization" - is not likely to include the consumers that 
MasterCard hopes the message will ultimately reach (i.e., the same 
audience to which the "Priceless" campaign is directed). Master-
Card's description of the charitable initiative is, like other informa-
tion about its IPO, included in its financial statements, the target 
audience for which is primarily investors and those who assist inves-
tors (brokers, financial planners, and so forth). This audience will be 
directly responsive to the announcement of the charitable initiative 
insofar as its structure affects the value of the corporation (which 
presumably includes such factors as the amount of the shares that 
will be owned by the charity, their value, and the charity's future 
43. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 152. 
44. See Ronald McDonald House Charities, http://www.rmhc.org/rmhc/in-
dex.html (last visited July 5, 2006). 
45. Sidney J. Levy, Imagery and Symbolism, in BRANDs, CoNSUMERS, SYMBOLS & 
RESEARCH 233, 236 (Dennis W. Rook, ed. 1999) ("The corporate image may be of sig-
nificance to consumers of the specific products by. reassuring them of the responsibil-
ity and quality of the manufacturer. It affects the buyers of company shares; it 
influences the government in its relations with the enterprise; and suppliers to the 
company will be guided by their image of it."). 
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ability to control the disposition of those shares). The branding mes-
sage conveyed by the announcement is important to this audience 
only insofar as it has the desired effect on consumers, which, in turn, 
increases the market value of the company. 46 In short, the audience 
who most directly hears the intended branding message of the chari-
table foundation is not the audience most directly involved in creat-
ing or rejecting branding meaning; it must rely on consumers, the 
remote audience, to do that work. 
Thus, the real target audience for the message that MasterCard 
is a community-minded organization is, primarily, current cardhold-
ers. Current cardholders are the ones who MasterCard hopes will be 
inspired by the message about charity, attribute those feelings to 
MasterCard, and choose to pull out their MasterCard rather than 
their Visa the next time they are making a purchase.47 In so doing, 
these consumers are themselves communicating the message that 
they, too, are charitable, even if that message is received only by the 
cashier who takes the card.48 Thus, for consumers, any guilt they 
might feel over the raw consumerism use of the card entails is palli-
ated by the vague feelings of charity they associate with the brand 
and, therefore, with themselves. 49 
So how, then, is this branding message (assuming it exists) 
transmitted, given that the true target audience is not the one to 
whom MasterCard is speaking? The answer is through branding in-
termediaries: the financial and general media that report on the de-
tails of the IPO to its readership, a readership that is, perhaps, more 
receptive to the kind of atmospheric advertising the IPO structure 
represents. In one sense, the brand itself might be said to be an in-
termediary in its role as a repository for a collection of information 
about a mark (not only information from the product or producer with 
which the mark is associated but also information from consumers 
46. Many thanks to Trotter Hardy for encouraging me to clarify this point. 
4 7. As with the "Priceless" campaign, the target audience for MasterCard's 
branding message here is likely not potential consumers but existing ones: the goal is 
(again) not to get those consumers to buy more of the product, but to get them to use 
the product they already have. 
48. Sidney J. Levy, Symbols for Sale, IIARv. Bus. REv. 117, 119 (July-Aug. 1959) 
("A symbol is appropriate (and the product will be used and enjoyed) when it joins 
with, meshes with, adds to, or reinforces the way the consumer thinks about 
himself."). 
49. It is possible that future cardholders, merchants, and issuing banks consti-
tute a secondary audience for this message, but they are presumably far in the dis-
tance given that both groups rely more on economic information to make their 
decisions than on brand advertising. 
Winter 2007] Metabranding and Intermediation 215 
about their reaction to that mark). But here I am focusing on a par-
ticipant in the trademark conversation whose presence is almost re-
quired in order for communication to occur. Without the media 
communicating MasterCard's IPO branding message to consumers, 
consumers are unlikely even to know such branding exists. This is 
different, then, from instances generally when media report on adver-
tising because in those instances the reporting serves to contribute to 
meaning that has already been communicated directly to the in-
tended audience. 
In communicating to consumers the branding messages they 
would not otherwise receive, branding intermediaries in the media 
are contributing to what might be called metabranding: the creation 
of brand meaning for a brand outside of the traditional producer-to-
consumer communication stream. 50 Here, MasterCard does not play 
this role for the IPO; it relies on the media to transmit the brand 
meaning on its behalf. Of course, branding intermediaries need not 
play a merely passive role in this exchange. The media might report 
on the establishment of the charitable foundation without comment, 
but it might also report favorably on this effort or critically, challeng-
ing the branding message intended by MasterCard. The key point is 
that to the extent the IPO structure is a branding moment at all, 
there is no branding effect without intermediaries. Someone other 
than MasterCard must tell the story in order for the message to be 
conveyed. 51 
III. AssESSING THE BRANDING MoMENT 
A. Bra~ding Through Intermediaries 
What, then, is the branding effect of MasterCard's charitable 
foundation? In his article in this issue, Prof. Fleischer is skeptical, 
50. The term "metabrand" has been used in various contexts but typically refers 
to the type of non producer contribution to brand meaning just described. See, e.g., 
Bill Breen, Desire: Connecting with What Customers Want, FAST CoMPANY, Feb. 1, 
2003, at 86 (quoting Melinda Davis as describing Oprah Winfrey as a "metabrand" 
who tells consumers what to think about brands); Roger Clarke, Meta-Brands, Jul. 
13, 2001, http://www.anu.edu.aulpeople/Roger.Clarke/DV/MetaBrands.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2007); Scarliff/Salvador Lexicon of Naming and Branding, http:// 
www.scarcliff.com/naming_and_branding_lexicon.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2006) 
(defining "metabrand" as "any brand which transcends several categories and 
prompts consumers to see those categories in a new light"). 
51. Cf Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996) 
("Most people know what they know about college basketball from the media. If the 
media call the NCAA toumament 'March Madness,' that is what the public will call it, 
or know it as."). 
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contrasting the branding effect of a charitable foundation when es-
tablished by a corporation like Ben & Jerry's, which already has an 
atmospheric of community-mindedness, with a corporation like Mas-
terCard, for which the fit with charitable impulses is less natural.52 
Thus, Prof. Fleischer suggests, the branding effect of the MasterCard 
IPO is weaker because it is seen as inconsistent.53 But because the 
IPO-as-branding event must take place through media in-
termediaries, it is not at all clear, contrary to what Prof. Fleischer 
suggests, that MasterCard's stated purposes for its charitable foun-
dation - education and microfinance - render the branding accom-
plished by the maneuver less effective. 
To be sure, corporations like Ben & Jerry's that attempt to create 
brand meaning through charitable giving consistent with its other at-
tempts at branding may succeed in creating a coherent, single brand. 
But to the extent that MasterCard is attempting to create a 
metabrand that is simply divorced from the quotidian drudgery of 
monthly payments and interest rates and instead is allied with com-
munity and family values, creating any kind of charitable institution 
at all may well accomplish this task. So, too, Prof. Fleischer's critique 
that structural limits on the Foundation's ability to donate funds may 
"mute" the brand impact because it makes the charitable nature of 
the Foundation more theoretical than real54 is, I think, beside the 
point. The point is not actually to provide charitable giving, although 
this is certainly a laudable goal. 55 The point is merely to have media 
intermediaries report on the plan to provide charitable giving, en-
courage consumers to use the product, and then retain those custom-
ers through inertia or future branding efforts, with the assumption 
that they will not defect if later media reports (no doubt buried in the 
nether regions of the Business section) note that MasterCard's chari-
table aspirations inevitably fell short. This is perhaps why Master-
Card chose to convey its charitable message through the IPO rather 
than simply setting up a separate foundation at some later point in 
52. Fleischer, supra note 1, at 152-53 (suggesting that "the strongest case to be 
made" is that education and microfinance are both associated with upward class mo-
bility and thus with increased access to consumerism). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 153. 
55. Interestingly, MasterCard did not file a U.S. trademark application for "The 
MasterCard Foundation" until January 5, 2007. Search of U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office TESS database conducted February 9, 2007. It did, however, file an ap-
plication to register the word mark "The MasterCard Foundation" for both 
promotional goods and charitable services in Canada in September 2005. Search of 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office trademark database conducted February 9, 
2007. 
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time or making a large donation to an existing charity. The IPO has 
received and will continue to receive considerable media coverage in 
and of itself; the discussion of the Foundation thus becomes part of 
the story in what amounts to free brand advertising.56 
B. Trademark Law's Response 
Finally, having spent a bit of time considering how the an-
nouncement of the Foundation through MasterCard's IPO might con-
stitute a branding moment, it is worth pondering whether the 
mechanism of brand intermediaries tells us anything interesting 
about trademark law itself. 
To the extent that trademark law would have anything to say 
about branding efforts such as the kind Prof. Fleischer describes of 
MasterCard, that response would likely sound in trademark dilution. 
In modern trademark law, trademark infringement is the workhorse. 
In a typical trademark infringement suit, the owner of a valid, pro-
tectable trademark brings suit against the second user of the same or 
a similar mark in the marketplace, alleging that the second (''junior") 
user's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among the relevant 
consuming public as to the source of the junior user's good (or, in 
some cases, as to the sponsorship or authorization of the good by the 
senior user). By contrast, trademark dilution focuses not on activity 
that is likely to lead to consumer confusion but rather on activity that 
is likely to dilute the selling power of the brand at issue, either by 
making the brand seem commonplace rather than unique (dilution by 
''blurring") or by creating negative or unwholesome associations for a 
famous brand (dilution by "tarnishment").57 Of the three types of 
branding that I described above, trademark infringement relates to 
brand distinction and brand differentiation, while trademark dilution 
focuses on the atmospherics of the brand (i.e., the brand's meaning 
unattached to any product or service). 
Whether a trademark dilution cause of action should exist at all 
has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. Some argue for 
56. To the extent one contends that using the IPO, and thus intermediaries, to 
convey this message risks a loss of control over brand meaning (as compared to direct 
advertising to consumers about the Foundation), this Essay argues that brand owners 
lose control over brand meaning in any event as soon as any advertising is released. 
See supra at 212. 
57. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act applies only to marks that are distinc-
tive and famous. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). The Act provides four factors that courts may 
consider in order to determine whether a mark so qualifies. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
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limitations on the action or outright abandonment of the doctrine. ss 
Others argue in favor of a remedy for the harm sought to be pre-
vented but take issue with the form U.S. dilution law takes.s9 Still 
others seek expansion of the property-like rights the law provides to 
trademark holders.so 
Recognition of the existence of trademark intermediaries pro-
vides another basis for reconsidering the effectiveness of trademark 
dilution law. A dilution action essentially argues not "we have spent 
a lot of money and effort on creating a strong and unique brand, and 
the defendant's activities use that brand to lure our customers away" 
- the core of an infringement action - but rather "we have spent a lot 
of money and effort on telling consumers what they should think 
about our brand, and the defendant's activities have caused them to 
think something different." While it may be defensible, under a natu-
ral rights or economic theory of trademark law, to contend that a de-
fendant should not be able to free-ride on the value created by the 
trademark holder, a dilution action (as usually described) contends 
something different: that the defendant's fault is in disrupting the 
associations that the consumer creates upon seeing the brand. In the 
prototypical dilution cases, "Kodak" engenders not only the corre-
sponding association "film" but also the corresponding association 
"piano"; "Coca-Coca" engenders not only the corresponding associa-
tion "All-American" but also "drug use."61 Whether the dilution claim 
is characterized as blurring or tarnishing is of no matter here; the 
essence of either claim is that the defendant has conveyed a different 
meaning for the brand from the one the brand owner intends. The 
58. See, e.g., Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 
IowA L. REv. 731 (2003) (contending that a dilution action should be unavailable to 
trademark holders who have extended their marks so broadly that they have, in ef-
fect, diluted the strength of their own marks); Klieger, supra note 17. 
59. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coher-
ent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HAsTINGS 
L.J. 117 (2004) (arguing that dilution law should be replaced with a cause of action 
that explicitly prohibits free-riding on famous marks); Gerard N. Magliocca, One and 
Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REv. 949 
(2001) (contending that trademark infringement and trademark dilution are comple-
mentary rather than competing doctrines). 
60. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 19 (identifYing preventing harm to brand eq-
uity as the goal of dilution law); Swann & Davis, Jr., supra note 19 (arguing that 
brand equity should be given broad protection). 
61. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029 (indi-
cating "Kodak pianos" as example of dilutive use); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, 
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (preliminarily enjoining "Enjoy Cocaine" 
poster based on, inter alia, tarnishment by dilution theory). 
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brand owner, in other words, is claiming a right to the exclusive 
mental association with the brand in the minds of the public.62 
Given that a brand owner's efforts to create a particular atmos-
pheric association can be successful only if the public accepts those 
efforts - in other words, a corporation can spend as much money as it 
likes on advertising, but those efforts can be deemed a success only if 
the public agrees with the message - it is unclear why the brand 
owner alone should be deemed to have any proprietary right over the 
public's mental association with the mark.63 A politician can spend 
many months and millions of dollars attempting to persuade the pub-
lic that he is an upstanding, reasonable person, but he has no right to 
demand that the public accept that message. So, too, with trade-
marks: If another's use of a mark causes disruption or diminishment 
in the associations consumers have with that mark, the result is at-
tributable to consumers' decisions to acknowledge that disruption, 
not to any deception on the part of the defendant. 64 
In short, it is control of mental association, not control of words, 
that is at the heart of trademark law. A trademark holder seeks not 
to restrict the use of a word or words per se; it seeks to restrict the 
62. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 
642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (in which the owner of the "Cabbage Patch Kids" 
brand of children's dolls prevailed in a dilution suit over the maker of bubble gum 
trading cards containing images of "Garbage Pail Kids"). As two commentators favor-
ably described the case, "(t]he owner of the Cabbage Patch Kids property ... was not 
seriously concerned that purchasers of Garbage Pail Kids bubble gum trading cards 
would be deceived as to source; rather ... she feared that the gross Garbage Pail 
images would make it no longer 'cool' to own a Cabbage Patch Kids doll." Swann & 
Davis, Jr., supra note 19, at 274 (footnote omitted). See also Deere & Co. v. MTD 
Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming preliminary injunction prevent-
ing use of animated version of plaintiffs trademark by competitor to poke fun at 
plaintiff on the ground that the "favorable attributes of the mark" would thereby be 
diminished). 
63. Jessica Litman made much the same point in 1999, as did Rochelle Dreyfuss 
in 1990. See Litman, supra note 32, at 1730 (''The argument that trade symbols ac-
quire intrinsic value - apart from their usefulness in designating the source - derives 
from consumers' investing those symbols with value for which they are willing to pay 
real money."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Lan-
guage in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 407 (1990) (suggesting 
that the "surplus value" of trademarks - the value they have other than as source 
indicators (such as the value of the Coca-Cola trademark on aT-shirt rather than on a 
soda can) - should belong to consumers as the ones who give value to the trademark 
beyond its pure signaling function). 
64. To be clear, I am not referring here to competitors who deceive consumers 
into thinking they are buying the trademark holder's goods when they are not (i.e., 
actions that constitute infringement and that are properly made unlawful under 
trademark and unfair competition law) or who initiate falsehoods about the trade-
mark holder or its product (which are addressed by tort actions such as trade libel and 
false advertising). 
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number and kinds of associations with that word in the mind of the 
consumer, whether that means eliminating associations with other 
products or producers, as occurs both in infringement actions and in 
blurring dilution actions, or eliminating associations with certain 
(unsavory) concepts, as in tarnishment dilution actions. Trademark 
law is not about the need to keep certain words free for descriptive or 
other use by competitors; it is about the production of brand meaning. 
And as Jessica Litman noted in 1999, the creation of trademark 
meaning is a joint enterprise between the mark holder and the con-
suming public. 65 This is not simply true in a commercial sense, in 
that the public creates the need for trademarks by choosing the prod-
ucts on which it will spend its money, although that is undeniable. It 
is also true in that trademarks work only because of the intellectual 
dexterity of the consuming public: a public that sees a "swoosh" and 
is able to associate that symbol with an athletic wear manufacturer 
called Nike; a public that recognizes that there may well be both a 
Continental Airlines and a Continental Bank in one commercial 
space and knows, when it hears "Continental" at a particular mo-
ment, to which entity the word refers; a public that can talk about 
something being a "Mickey Mouse operation" without thinking that 
Disney is behind the scenes; a public that hears "Where's the beef?" 
during a political campaign and gets the joke. 
For all its talk about consumer confusion, trademark law actu-
ally places a fair amount of trust and confidence in consumers to 
manage competing associations and negotiate among various mean-
ings attached to the same words or phrases. It requires them not 
only to make and remember the association between the trademark 
and the product or producer but also to distinguish that mental link 
from others using the same or a similar mark. The fanciful mark 
''Xerox" may have only one user and one association, but the mark 
"United" has multiple users and multiple associations, including an 
airline, a moving company, a major league soccer team, and multiple 
banking institutions in the United States, all of which peacefully co-
exist. Indeed, as I noted earlier, trademark law imposes on the con-
sumer something of a postmodern task of creating meaning and 
association for a particular mark. 
What, then, can MasterCard's branding through intermediaries 
tell us about dilution law? My contention is that the existence and, 
65. Litman, supra note 32, at 1725 (noting that "the law now protects the imagi-
nary values painted by advertising campaigns independent of any features of the 
products they advertise"). 
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indeed, necessity of branding intermediaries in the MasterCard sce-
nario point out the infeasibility of dilution law writ large. If branding 
intermediaries can either accept or reject the call to convey the in-
tended brand message to the consuming base, and by rejecting the 
task actually convey the reverse message (as occurred in the skepti-
cal reporting on MasterCard's charitable initiative), those in-
termediaries have the power to engage in brand dilution. They are 
contributing to the creation of an association with the brand in the 
consumer's mind directly contrary to the one that the brand owner 
intended. Indeed, these intermediaries are not merely offering com-
mentary on the brand holder's goods or services- they are engaging 
in a direct attack on the branding effort itself. If such activity is im-
mune from suit under the First Amendment, as it surely is (assuming 
the reporting conveys no false facts),66 then it is unclear why a simi-
lar disruption of brand meaning by another player in the commercial 
marketplace should be unlawful. 67 By its very nature, a dilution 
cause of action alleges no diversion of revenue from the brand holder 
- when Kodak sues the hypothetical maker of Kodak pianos, it is not 
alleging that consumers are buying the pianos because they believe 
the film company is associated with the pianos in some way - but 
rather a harm to the meaning of the brand itself. Some proponents of 
an expanded view of the intellectual property rights of trademark 
holders, and thus of an expanded view of what dilution law should 
protect, articulate the harm to be prevented as the "impairment of 
brand equity"- in other words, a use that creates associations and 
meanings contrary to the one the mark holder intends. 68 If a trade-
mark holder cannot prevent a branding intermediary from engaging 
in such activity in its communications with the trademark holder's 
consumers, it is curious why it has the right, under current law, to 
66. Even trademark expansionists concede that consumer reporting should fall 
outside the scope of dilution law, despite its negative effect on brand equity, because 
such uses "reflect the public's countervailing interest in full and fair information." 
Swann & Davis, Jr., supra note 19, at 296. 
67. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687 1699 n.56 (1999) (calling the theory of "contributory dilution" -
"that individuals who use a mark generically, or media who do not treat it as a brand 
name, are contributing to the loss of distinctive significance of the mark" - "the most 
pernicious concept ever to come out of trademark theory"); Klieger, supra note 17, at 
830 ("Unless senior users of a mark have an absolute right to control the mark and its 
associations, tarnishment without resulting consumer confusion should not be 
actionable."). 
68. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 19, at 421 (defining dilution as "the impair-
ment of brand equity caused by a use of the mark that creates associations and 
images inconsistent with the equity"). 
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prevent such activity when conducted by other noncompetitors. 69 
Both the manufacturer of "Ben & Jerry's pianos" and the newspaper 
article reporting on the company's less-than-folksy corporate activi-
ties (both wholly hypothetical) arguably disrupt the company's brand 
meaning; both the manufacturer and the newspaper can communi-
cate directly with the company's consumers; and both the manufac-
turer and the newspaper are engaged in (presumably) profitable 
activities that are not direct substitutes for any of the company's 
sales. Yet dilution law penalizes only the manufacturer's activities 
and not the newspaper's.7o 
Having relied on the media to transmit a particular characteriza-
tion of its IPO branding event to its intended audience, MasterCard 
cannot be heard to complain when the media chooses to transmit a 
different characterization; it should likewise not be able to complain 
when others engage in brand disruption that is different only in de-
gree, not in kind. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
In contending that unorthodox initial public offering structures 
may constitute branding moments, Prof. Fleischer has reminded us 
that brand owners are engaged in a constant effort to shape brand 
meaning. But it is less important, I think, to look at the nature of 
that meaning (and whether it aligns with other instances of brand 
creation) and more useful to consider what the IPO-as-branding exer-
cise can tell us about the construction of brand meaning more gener-
ally. Prof. Fleischer's consideration of the MasterCard IPO in 
particular provides a useful starting point. 
Brand owners are ultimately at the mercy of their consumers. 
They can hope to influence brand meaning through advertising, but 
they have no control over whether consumers accept or reject that 
69. Cf. Nelson, supra note 58, at 735 (contending that trademark owners who 
make "ubiquitous" use of their own marks are engaging in self-dilution and thus 
should be denied a remedy under dilution law against others). 
70. The First Amendment cannot explain away this distinction entirely; 
nondeceptive commercial speech is entitled to constitutional protection. See, e.g., 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (permitting regulation of commercial speech concerning lawful activity and 
that is not misleading under the First Amendment only when "the asserted govern-
mental interest is substantial," "the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted," and the regulation "is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest"). The Federal Trademark Dilution Act exempts use of a mark in 
comparative advertising; noncommercial use of a mark; parody, criticism, or commen-
tary; and news reporting and news commentary from its ambit. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(3). 
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message. A corporation that hopes to convey a branding message to 
its consumers through its IPO structure faces the added challenge of 
not being able to speak to those consumers directly but instead rely-
ing on media intermediaries to report (and, possibly, restate) that 
message. From a postmodern view, the insertion of intermediaries is 
likely of little moment: Given that consumers are the ultimate cre-
ators of meaning, the loss of corporate control over the message oc-
curs immediately upon dissemination, whether the company conveys 
the message directly to consumers or does so through another entity. 
If this is true, perhaps we should rethink whether there is any real 
difference when a competitor, rather than the media or, indeed, the 
corporation itself, initiates this loss of control. In other words, per-
haps trademark law should care much less about the destabilization 
of brand meaning (at least where no deception is involved) because 
destabilization is a natural form of brand existence. In this regard, 
by highlighting a clear example of brand destabilization at work, 
Prof. Fleischer has given not only corporate scholars but also intellec-
tual property scholars some food for thought. 
